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The elements of a comprehensive process of authoritative and control-
ling decision (including both a constitutive process' by which law is
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1. The conception of constitutive process here employed is summarized as
follows:
In the terms we find convenient, the "constitutive process" of a
community may be described as the decisions which identify and char-
acterize the different authoritative decision-makers, specify and clar-
ify basic community policies, establish appropriate structures of au-
thority, allocate bases of power for sanctioning purposes, authorize
procedures for making the different kinds of decisions, and secure
the continuous performance of all the different kinds of decision
functions (intelligence, promotion, prescription, etc.) necessary to
making and administering general community policy.
Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
362, 386 (1971).
The different kinds of decision functions, or outcomes of constitutive proc-
ess, are specified as:
Intelligence: Obtaining information about the past, making esti-
mates of the future, planning.
Promoting: Urging proposals.
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made and applied and an emerging flow of public order decisions for
the shaping and sharing of all values) are of course omnipresent in all
of mankind's different territorial communities, ancient and modern.
2
Our inherited theories about law differ immensely, however, in the
comprehensiveness and precision with which they make reference to
these elements. Quite commonly such theories, whether described
as "political thought" or "jurisprudence," fail to focus clearly upon
the interrelations of authoritative decision and effective power proc-
ess, and inquiry about such interrelations is made to proceed through
imprecise and diverse conceptions of "community," "state," "politics"
and "law."3 Some theories emphasize-to the detriment of deliberate,
innovative creation and change-that the genuine "constitution" of
any community must consist of the perspectives which community
members create in each other about the requirements of decision by
their continuous cooperative, or "customary," behavior; other theories
seek to confine the reference of "constitution" to deliberately created
instruments, to the detriment of inquiry about ongoing customary
processes.4 With respect to both conceptions of constitution, em-
Prescribing: Projecting authoritative policies.
Invoking: Confronting concrete situations with provisional
characterization in terms of a prescription to con-
crete circumstances.
Applying: Final characterization and execution of a prescrip-
tion in a concrete situation.
Terminating: Ending a prescription or arrangement within the
scope of a prescription.
Appraising: Comparison between goals and performance.
Id. at 387.
2. McBain, Constitutions, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 259
(1937); MERRIAM , POITrICAL POWER, ITS CO~vOSlTiON AND INCIDENCE (1934);
OPPENHEIMXER, THE STATE; ITS HISTORY A~N DEVELOPMENT VIEWED SOCIOLOGI-
CALLY (2d Am. ed. 1942); Shepard, Government: History and Theory, in 7 EN-
CYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 8 (1937); Weyrauch, The "Basic Law" or"Constitution" of a Small Group, 27 J. Soc. IssuES 49 (1971).
3. Excellent expositions of the particular history with which we are here
concerned appear in GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPAATION OF POWERS,
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1965); LOWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER AND THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1957); McILwAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT
AND MODERN (rev. ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as McILwAIN, CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM]; MCILwAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST FROM THE
GREEKS TO THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1932) [hereinafter cited as McILwAmN,
THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT]; VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPA-
RATION OF POWERS (1967); Sturm, Constitutionalism: A Critical Appreciation
and an Extension of the Political Theory of C. H. McIlwain, 54 MINN. L. REV.
215 (1969).
Histories of "political thought" are of course replete with relevant discus-
sion. See, e.g., THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE (H. Lubasz ed. 1964);
DUNNING, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES, FROM LUTHER TO MONTESQUIEU
(1905); DUNNING, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES, FROM ROUSSEAU TO
SPENCER (1920); FINER, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GOVERNMENT
94, 116, 139 (rev. ed. 1949); FRIEDRICH, MAN AND HIs GOVERNMENT: AN EM-
PIRICAL THEORY OF POLITICS (1963); Friedrich, Constitutions and Constitutional-
ism, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 318 (1968);
La Palombara, Values and Ideologies in the Administrative Evolution of West-
ern Constitutional Systems in POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT
166 (Brabanti ed. 1969); MAcIVER, THE MODERN STATE (1926); PARKINSON, THE
EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (1958); WATKINS, THE POLITICAL TRADITION
OF THE WEST: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1948).
4. A brief indication of the differences that different theories make for
conceptions of constitutive process is offered in ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING
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phasis is often placed more upon features designed to limit decision
than upon the decisions which in fact establish and maintain the
process.5
Although most of the features of a comprehensive constitutive proc-
ess of authoritative decision are accorded some mention, however in-
direct or implicit in some theories, few of the great historic theories
even attempt a systematic and integrated reference to all the dif-
ferent phases of constitutive process-from participation, through the
establishment of perspectives and structures of authority, the alloca-
tion of bases of power, and the conduct of strategies, to the securing
of demanded outcomes. In particular, the different types of decision
outcomes necessary to the effective making and application of law
are seldom clearly discriminated, but are rather discussed in vague
terms which refer more to organs or structures of authority or to a
distribution of bases of power than to decision outcomesY In many
theories distinctions between the intensities with which different con-
stitutive policies, from the most to the least fundamental, are de-
manded by community members are not noted; in a few theories even
the distinction between constitutive and other decisions is obscured.
7
Much of this confusion in traditional theories about constitutive
process would appear to derive from the fact that such theories are
most often designed to serve the purposes not of careful empirical de-
scription but rather of preference or advocacy. Historically, the
focus of scholarship has been more upon "constitutionalism" as a set
of preferred constitutive goals or policies than upon the comprehen-
sive pattern of community practices, consisting of both perspectives
and operations, by which any postulated goals are made effective or
ineffective.8 When the intellectual tasks of description, goal clarifica-
Ch. 1 (6th ed. 1958). Observe the very limited reference of "constitutional
law" in Pritchette, Introduction to Constitutional Law, in 3 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL ScIENcES 295 (1968); cf. FRIEDRICH, MAN AND Is
GOVERNMENT: AN EMPIRICAL THEORY OF PoIJTIcs 271 (1963). The range of
potential references is summarized in Lowenstein, Constitutions and Constitu-
tional Law in the West and East, 30 INDIAN J. POL. Sci. 203 (1969); McILwAiN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM Ch. 1.
For an extraordinarily perceptive statement of the role of custom in con-
stitution making, see TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1890).
5. Note the emphasis in Hamilton, Constitutionalism, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 255 (1937) and in many of the essays in GOVERNMVENT
UNDER LAW-A CONFERENCE HELD AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ON THE OCCASION
OF THE BICENTENNIAL OF JOHN MARSHALL, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES,
1801-1835 (Sutherland ed. 1956).
6. The history of this confusion is beautifully traced in the books by GWYN
and VILE, note 3 supra.
7. Note the very oblique reference to policies in WHEARE, MODERN CONSTI-
TUTIONS Ch. 3 (1951).
The relevant distinctions are made in MAcIvER, THE MODERN STATE 250
(1926); McILwAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM 13.
8. For a brilliant description of the history of this emphasis upon prefer-
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tion, scientific hypothesis, and invention of alternatives are confused
in a single set of ambiguous terms, even the one task of goal clarifica-
tion, so consistently emphasized in "constitutionalism," must suffer.
Fortunately, in the most contemporary inquiries some social scien-
tists would appear to be beginning to perceive the importance both of
framing a comprehensive and detailed theory of constitutive process,
including a more precise discrimination of decision functions, and of
distinguishing the descriptive, preferential, and scientific intellectual
tasks.9
Some conception of constitutive process would appear to be coeval
with the origins of theorizing about law. The notion of the "nomoi of
a state" as "its written constitution" and "a thing sacrosanct, to be
touched or altered only with the gravest precaution" has been traced
back to the allocations and dispensations by and among the gods.1 0
Even before Plato and Aristotle had "made the constitution of au-
thority the central issue in politics," the early Greek liberals had
achieved a conception of law in terms of a secular, empirical process
in which the members of a community sought, in clarifying and im-
plementing their common interests, to draw upon their past ex-
perience for future guidance." The Aristotelian conception of poiiteia,
somewhat more expansive in reference than constitutive process, em-
bodied a substantial segment of community process and was employed
for both descriptive and preferential purposes.12 "The polity is," as
Aristotle put it, "an ordering of the polis in respect of its offices and
especially in respect of the one supreme over all others. For the su-
premacy is everywhere in the governing class of the polls, and the
governing class is the polity.'u 3 The emphasis of both Plato and
Aristotle was upon degrees of participation in government and the
purposes of its establishment, and they distinguished between mon-
archic, aristocratic, and democratic forms, finding genuine and spur-
ious variants of each. Aristotle made a strong case for rule by law,
recommended a "mixed" form of government to achieve this, and of-
fered a preliminary discrimination of governmental departments in
terms of "the deliberative, the executive, and the judicial."' 4
ential conceptions see LOWNsTEIN, note 3 supra. For comparable presenta-
tions, see FRIEDRICH, Mom AND HIs GovERNmENT: AN EvinrmxcAL THEORY or
POLITics (1963); Hamilton, Constitutionalism, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL ScIENCEs 255 (1937).
This confusion is endemic in the concept of "obligation," mingling ambigu-
ously ascribed preference with description. See PoLrricAL AND LEGAL OBLIGA-
TIoN (Pennock & Chapman eds. 1970).
9. ALmoND & POWELL, JR., COMPARATIVE PoLiTIcs: A DEVELOPMENTAL AP-
PROACH (1966); HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968);
Caldwell, Book Review, 10 NATURAL L. FORUm 275 (1965).
10. CORNFoRD, FROm RELIGION TO PILosoPHY A STUDY IN T=E ORIGINs OF
WEsTERN SPECULATION 29 (1957).
11. HAVELOcK, THE LIBERAL TEMPER IN GREEK POLmTCs 17 passim (1957).
12. BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY: PLATO AND HIs PREDECESSORS 6
(1918); GREENIDGE, A HANDBOOK OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1896).
13. MCILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 77.
14. Id. at 92; McILwAiN, CONSTITUTIONALISM Ch. 2. See also BARKER, THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE (Dover ed. 1959); SABINE, A HIs-
TORY OF POLITICAL THEORY Chs. 3-6 (3d ed. 1961); VILE, supra note 3, Ch. 2.
HeinOnline -- 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  4 1972-1973
Trends in Theories About Law
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The Roman conceptions of constitutive process, somewhat less ex-
pansive than those of the Greeks, evolved through a long period of
time and took many forms, and were commonly designed to subject
naked power to authority and to insure that authority did in fact de-
rive from the people.':' In his description of the republican constitu-
tion Polybius adopted the Greek notion of mixed government, not
merely to secure a balancing of social classes or estates, but to recom-
mend a distribution of competence among different organs of govern-
ment.1 The persuasiveness of Cicero's exposition of natural law con-
tributed greatly to the establishment of the notion that constitutional
law is a more fundamental law, a more intensely demanded set of
community policies, by which the actions of rulers and governors are
to be appraised.
17
The many subsequent contributions to theories about constitutive
process throughout the Middle Ages and in the more recent centuries
of the nation-state mostly represent comparable efforts to achieve
certain immediate constitutional goals by the rearrangement or mod-
ification of some particular feature of the more comprehensive proc-
ess, whose principal outlines are left largely implicit.18 Lord Coke's
insistence that even the King in Parliament was subject to the com-
mon law gave new sustenance to the notion that some policies, es-
pecially those relating to individual rights, were so fundamental that
a constitution could put them beyond the reach of temporary ma-
jorities.19 The most influential individual contribution was perhaps
that of Montesquieu in his reformulation of the earlier notions of
"mixed government" into an explicit doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers among legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of government.20  The contributions of American theorists
to judicial review, areal distribution of powers, explicit provision for
constitutional amendment, representation and administration have
become the common stock of mankind and have affected constitution-
making around the world. 21 In little of this great inheritance of
15. 1 BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 134 (1901); McILwAIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM Ch. 3; MCILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT Ch.
4; SABINE, supra note 14, Ch. 9.
16. MCILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 100; PAMMNSON, supra
note 3, at 111; SABINE, supra note 14, at 154.
17. SABINE, supra note 14, at 154.
18. 2 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 121-23, 195, 196 (1922);
10 id. at 647-50 (1938); MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM Ch. 4; MCILWAIN,
THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT Chs. 5-6; SABINE, supra note 14, Pts. 2,
3.
19. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM 14, 87; SABINE, supra note 14, at 451-
54.
20. SABINE, supra note 14, at 551-60; VILE, supra note 3, Ch. 6.
21. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1935);
MERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES (1924); SUTHERLAND,
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA; ORIGIN AND EGOLUTION OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL
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"political thought" or theorizing about constitutive process, however,
does one find either a systematic and integrated presentation of all
the different relevant features of that process or a very precise dis-
crimination, in ways to facilitate policy-oriented inquiry, of the dif-
ferent types of decisions taken in such process.
It could scarcely be expected that theories about law which pri-
marily emphasize derivations of authority from transempirical prem-
ises, whether theological or metaphysical, would achieve a compre-
hensive and systematic description of secular constitutive processes,
with a precise delimitation of all the necessary decision functions
in the making and application of constitutive and other prescriptions.
Even the earliest "religious-metaphysical" theories did, however, ex-
hibit certain aspiring, primitive approaches toward the conception of
such a process. 22 Thus, some of these theories made various recom-
mendations in concept and procedure designed for such purposes as
harmonizing the conflicting interests in a community into perspec-
tives of common interest, balancing the effective power of different
classes and interests, outlining a viable framework of government,
making authority an important base of power, establishing uniform
procedures for the making of different types of decisions, and mak-
ing certain necessary distinctions between the prescription of general
rules and their application in particular instances. 23 When, further-
more, "natural law" theories, including both these early "religious-
metaphysical" theories and later more empirically-oriented assump-
tions and derivations, are considered as a whole, the contributions
made by such theories to our contemporary notions of constitutive
process can only be described as extensive and indispensable.24 In the
long history of constitutional thought and development many different
speculative philosophers and practical reformers, employing both
transempirical and mixed transempirical and empirical assumptions
and derivations, have made enduring contributions to every impor-
tant feature of a comprehensive constitutive process. A brief, tabu-
lar itemization, making no pretense of either comprehensiveness or
homogeneity, may indicate the great range of such contributions in
both theoretical construct and practical device:2 5
Participation
-legitimacy of rule by gods, agents of gods, kings, tyrants,
philosopher-kings, oligarchies and aristocracies;
IDEAS (1965); SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2d ed.
1954); WATKINS, THE POLITICAL TRADITION IN THE WEST (1948); WHEARE,
supra note 7, at 79; Cover, Book Review, 70 CoLum. L. REv. 1475 (1970);
Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers,"
2 U. CH. L. REV. 385 (1935).
22. CORNFORD, supra note 10, Chs. 1, 2; HAVEL OcK, supra note 11, at 30.
23. For a survey, see LOWENSTEIN, note 3 supra.
24. See note 3 supra.
See also BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, THE PHILSOSPHY AND METHOD OF
LAW 255, 276 (1962); Schnee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in GoVERNMIENT
UNDER LAW (Sutherland ed. 1956).
25. The items tabulated have been gleaned from many of the sources cited
above. One rich source is VILE, note 3 supra.
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-distinction of individuals from groups;
-distinction of individuals from successive generations;
-direct democracy;
-participation by techniques in representation;
-universal suffrage;
-equality in participation;
-limitations upon participation by criteria of caste or class or
other factors irrelevant to contribution or merit;
-special techniques for participation by minority groups.
Perspectives
-demands that decisions be taken by criteria of authority rather
than by naked power;
-demands that the members of a community be permitted to
establish their own constitution;
-demands that government be made to serve certain specified
ends, such as common interests, justice, liberty, and the good
life;
-demands that government be made to protect certain funda-
mental rights of the individual (natural, inalienable or human
rights);
-demands that government be made to serve positive social or
welfare functions;
-expectations that some constitutive prescriptions are demanded
with higher degrees of intensity than others (as in "bills of
rights" or as ius cogens);
-expectations that particular decisions which are not in con-
formity with constitutive prescriptions will be regarded as
without authority.
Arenas
-intermingling of religious and political institutional struc-
tures;
-separation of political and religious structures;
-establishment of, different branches of government to per-
form different policy functions;
-separation of executive and parliamentary structures;
-recognition of an independent judicial branch of government;
-invention of structures of bureaucratic administration;
-centralization and decentralization of structures on a geo-
graphic basis (regionalism, local self-government).
Bases of Power
-the notion that the sovereign is above the law;
-expectations that the processes of authoritative decision ("the
law") are supreme over all particular participants and that
none is free from such processes;
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-legitimacy myths of a great variety;
-the myth of an original binding agreement;
-distribution and balancing of competences and other power
between different classes and groups;
-broad and narrow distributions of the right of franchise;
-distribution and balancing of competences and other power
between different structures of government;
-distribution of explicit reciprocal checking competences be-
tween the different structures of government (vetoes, judicial
review).
Strategies
-demands that decisions be taken by authorized, uniform pro-
cedures;
-demands that procedures be open, non-coercive, and economic;
-social compact theories;
-techniques for ascertaining, supplementing, and integrating
customary expectations;
-written constitutions, with explicit formulations of competences
and bills of rights;
-techniques of representation and parliamentary procedure;
-techniques of executive and bureaucratic administration;
-judicial review;
-procedures for individual challenge of decisions allegedly in-
compatible with authority.
Outcomes
-discriminations, in varying degrees of clarity, between the
different types of decisions necessary to the making and ex-
ecution of general community policies;
-distinguishing the prescription of general policies from their
application in particular instances;
-,distinguishing a "power of judging" from the more general
"execution" of laws;
-attempts to distinguish different types of decisions as legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial;
-recognition that any particular structure of government may
perform many different functions, and that any particular
function may be performed by many different structures;
-attempts to confine the performance of particular functions to
particular structures.
As impressive as are all these historic contributions to constitutive
process, affected at least in part by the invocation and application of
"natural law" theories, it must still be remembered that the "natural
law" emphasis alone offers no secure intellectual tools for identifica-
tion and evaluation in context of any particular feature of constitu-
tive process, much less for the performance of all relevant intellectual
tasks about the whole of such process. 26 The tools of faith, revela-
26. The strictures we made about the contributions of natural law the-
ory to clarification of the concepts of authority and control are equally rele-
vant here. See Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44
S. CAL. L. REv. 362, 365.
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tion, cognition of absolutes, natural reason, and syntactic derivation
commonly yield but a darkling or ambiguous enlightenment and can
be plausibly employed in justification of features of constitutive proc-
ess which are, as some of the items above suggest, inimical to, rather
than expressive of, the values of human dignity. One is tempted to
conclude that the important achievements of the "natural law" em-
phasis have been despite, rather than because of, its intellectual tools.
The distinctive contribution to constitutive process of the historical
frame of reference, shaped by its intense identification of all law with
empirical community processes, has of course been in its insistence
that a community's constitution, even when partially expressed in a
formal document, is, like its less basic public order prescriptions, more
a product of custom-that is, of expectations created by the coopera-
tive behavior and informal communications of community members-
than of deliberate creative action.27 Savigny found a people's con-
stitution, like its other law, of a "fixed character," affected by "the
particular faculties and tendencies of an individual people." What
binds law, language, manners and constitution "into one whole is the
common conviction of the people, the kindred consciousness of an in-
ward necessity, excluding all notion of an accidental and arbitrary
origin."28 In his discussion of the state and its relation to public and
private law he explains:
If we enquire as to the origin of the state, we must posit that
origin in a higher necessity, in a formative power proceeding from
within, as has been above generally asserted of law; and this
holds good not only of the existence of a state generally but also
of the particular shape presented by the state in each people.
Thus also the creation of the state is a species of the generation of
law and it is certainly the highest degree of that generation.
2 9
When a theory does not clearly distinguish authority and control, and
does not identify authoritative decision as an isolable component with-
in community process, it is not surprising that it offers no map of a
comprehensive constitutive process or specification of intellectual
tools for inquiry about such process. Similarly, a theory which em-
phasizes "fixed character," "higher necessities," "inner necessities,"
and "historical rights" and rejects "accidental and arbitrary origins"
can obviously be used to obstruct change and hinder constitutive and
27. PLUNKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 76 (5th ed. 1956);
2 VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE Ch. 4 (1922).
28. VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND
JURISPRUDENCE 24 (1831).
For intimations of an English parallel, see Montrose, Book Review, 6
NATURAL L. FORUM 201 (1961).
29. VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 18 (1867).
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public order innovations.30 The most optimistic interpretation of the
theory associated with Savigny is perhaps that of Carl Becker: "It
opened the door to progress in terms of nationality while refusing ad-
mission to revolutionary methods."' 31 "It was Savigny above all,"
Becker expands, "who taught the nineteenth century how to justify
progressive changes in institutions without countenancing violent
revolution and how to think of the differing institutions of many na-
tions as being all in harmony with nature and all equally pleasing in
God's sight. '32 Sir Henry Maine did emphasize the development of
law by judgments, custom, fictions, equity, legislation, and general
jurisprudence and was appropriately contemptuous of the notion that
all law emanates from established officials, but he also was fearful
that law might be developed too rapidly and does not appear to have
advanced any comprehensive and systematic notions of constitutive
process.33 Professor Maitland questioned Austin's view that the prin-
cipal object of constitutional law was to define the sovereign 34 and
found that "[w] e cannot get on without the State, or the Nation, or
the Commonwealth, or the Public, or some similar entity. . . ,"5 but
he was quite pessimistic about the creation of entities appropriate for
comparative inquiry, and his own conception of constitutional law
was so narrow as to exclude administrative law.
The basic tenet of the analytical frame of reference-that law ema-
nates from the will of some established "sovereign" or official
source-directly affects its notions of constitutive process and of the
types of decisions emerging from such process for the shaping of pub-
lic order. The paradigm of this emphasis is not that of an interaction
in social process in which many different participants engage in the
continuous creation and recreation of authoritative community poli-
cies, but rather that, in the words of C.K. Allen, "of an omnipotent
authority standing high above society, and issuing downwards its be-
hests."36 The principal concern of the emphasis is more for the sys-
tematic presentation of the commands or rules emanating from the
"sovereign" source than for inquiry about how determinate persons
acquire such competence and their effective capabilities for ensuring
30. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 16; HANEs, THE REVIAL OF NATURAL LAW
CONCEPTS 68 (1930).
The predisposition against innovation is pervasive in CARTER, LAW: ITS
ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION (1907). See also MAINE, POPULAR GoVERN-
MENT (5th ed. 1897).
31. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY
oF POLITICAL IDEAS 266 (1942).
32. Id. at 263.
33. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1920); MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS
(1888); Smellie, Sir Henry Maine, in 10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
49 (1937).
For a balanced appraisal of Maine's contribution, see 2 VINOGRADoFF,
COLLECTED PAPERS Ch. 8 (1928).
34. MAITLAND, SELECTED ESSAYS 529 (Hazeltine, Lapsley, & Winfield eds.
1936).
35. Id. at 112.
36. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 1. The authoritarian nature of this conception
is noted in Friedrich, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, in 3 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 318 (1968).
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compliance with their commands. The most extreme and still most
influential formulation of this emphasis, built broadly upon the abso-
lutisms of Bodin and Hobbes and upon Bentham's notion of law as
command, is that of John Austin.3 7 From Austin's conceptions of the
"sovereign" as "a determinate human superior, not in the habit of
obedience to a like superior" and receiving "habitual obedience from
the bulk of a given society" and of law as the command of this
sovereign, it followed that "the mass of customs, understandings and
conventions" commonly regarded as "constitutional law" could not, as
against the sovereign, be accurately described as "law," but only as
"positive morality."38 Austin made this conclusion explicit:
I mean by the expression constitutional law, the positive morality,
or the compound of positive morality and positive law, which
fixes the constitution or structure of the given supreme govern-
ment. I mean the positive morality, or the compound of positive
morality and positive law, which determines the character of the
person, or the respective characters of the persons, in whom, for
the time being, the sovereignty shall reside: and, supposing the
government in question an aristocracy or government of a num-
ber, which determines moreover the mode wherein the sovereign
powers shall be shared by the constituent members of the sover-
eign number or body.3 9
The only saving qualification was that constitutional law might be
described as "law" against the members of the sovereign body "con-
sidered severally." It is from this grotesque notion that law-making
is the relatively exclusive function of an absolute sovereign that we
derive our contemporary, widespread illusions that legislation is
something "political" and not "legal," and that the principal concern
of law is largely with the application of rules.40 Austin did give some
explicit attention to different types of decisions, noting that the
words legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative were em-
ployed with imprecise meanings, referring sometimes to structures,
sometimes to powers, and sometimes to types of decisions, but he no-
37. For a classic presentation of the views of the major figures in this em-
phasis, see DUNNING, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES: FROM LUTHER To
MONTESQUIEU (1905).
38. The definitions from Austin may be found in 1 AUSTIN, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE 226 (4th ed. Campbell 1873). The latter quoted words,
and the basic point, are taken from DUNNING, supra note 37, at 225. Cf.
HAINES, supra note 30, at 71.
39. AUSTIN, supra note 38, at 274. It is interesting to compare the views
about the nature of a constitution ascribed to Judge Learned Hand by Judge
Charles Wyzanski. See Wyzanski, Constitutionalism: Limitation or Affirma-
tion, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 473, 478 (Sutherland ed. 1956).
40. Observe the difficulties in connection with the concept of "constitutional
law" encountered in DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 22 (9th ed. Wade 1939) and PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN
AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 166 (1953).
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where attempts to clarify the confusion or to achieve a homogeneous
categorization for reference to structures, competences, and func-
tions.4 He was much too obsessed with the futile task of distinguish-
ing between supreme and subordinate powers.4 2  It has been fre-
quently noted-with only modest apparent effect on professional per-
spectives-that Austin's complex theory is a complete misdescription
of English attitudes and practices of his time and is a most inadequate
tool for comparative inquiry through time and across geographic
boundaries.
43
The theory propounded by Kelsen for describing constitutive proc-
ess is even further abstracted from the empirical events of decision,
and its causes and consequences, than that of Austin. Kelsen gives
much attention to "the State" and to constitutions, including many
details, and finds that a constitution in a "material sense" is "an es-
sential element of every legal order."44 In his "pure" theory, how-
ever, "the State" is dissolved as "the personification of the national
legal order" or the "hypostatization of certain moral political postu-
lates" and made "identical" with "the law" or "national legal order,145
while "the constitution in the material sense," as contrasted with a
formal "solemn document," is made to refer merely to "those rules
which regulate the creation of the general legal norms, in particular
the creation of statutes.."4 6 The basic "grundnorm," or "first consti-
tution," which Kelsen stipulates for appraisal of the "validity" of the
whole hierarchy of subordinate norms, is never explicitly related to
either the effective power processes which establish it or to the com-
munity expectations which give it authority; it is merely "presup-
posed": 47 "It is postulated that one ought to behave as the individ-
ual, or the individuals, who laid down the first constitution have or-
dained.148  The relevant identities and activities of decision-makers
are restricted to those established by authoritative norms; "the indi-
vidual who creates the legal norm is an organ of the legal community
because and insofar as his function is determined by a legal norm of
the order constituting the legal community."49 The norms projected
by the constitution are not the perspectives-demands, identifica-
tions, and expectations-of identifiable community members, but
rather mere ought-form statements, ambiguous both as to the author
of the preferences and as to content50 The account given of struc-
41. AUSTIN, supra note 38, at 255.
42. Id. at 258.
43. 1 BRYCE, supra note 15, at 537, 614; AINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITU-
TIONS 342 (1888); MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 526
(1908); VINOGRADOFF, COMMON SENSE IN LAW 28 (2d Rev. ed. 1946); Wade,
Introduction to DICEY, supra note 40, at xxxv.
44. K*ELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE 125 (1945),
45. Id. at xvi.
46. Id. at 125, 267.
47. Id. at 110, 115.
48. Id. at 115.
For a description of this basic norm as a substitute for Austin's concept of
sovereignty, see PATTERSON, supra note 40, at 92.
49. KELSEN, supra note 44, at 132.
50. Id. at 35.
HeinOnline -- 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  12 1972-1973
Trends in Theories About Law
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
tures of authority is in the conventional terms of legislative, execu-
tive, judicial, and administrative, although it is emphasized that the
"separation of powers" does not accord with the facts and that the
same structure may perform more than one decision function.51 The
only base of power regarded as relevant is authority, to the complete
exclusion of all factors affecting control; concern with control is ex-
hausted by assuming the efficacy of the total system.5 2  The pro-
cedures recommended by Kelsen for determining the "validity" of an
alleged norm bear a compelling resemblance to mere philosophical
syntactics. For the "usual trichotomy" of decision functions Kelsen
would substitute a dichotomy of "law-creating" and "law-applying,"
and he suggests that even the difference between these two functions
is "merely relative. '53 Thus, he states that with certain exceptions
"every act is ... at the same time a law-creating and a law-applying
act.15 4 "The creation of a legal norm is-normally-an application,"
it is explained, "of the higher norm, regulating its creation, and the
application of a higher norm is-normally-the creation of a lower
norm determined by the higher norm."55 In a side comment upon
J.C. Gray's assertion that "the real rulers of political society are un-
discoverable" Kelsen remarks, in perhaps fitting summary of the con-
straints which he imposes upon inquiry, that while "what indi-
viduals influence those who create valid norms of the legal order con-
stituting the State may be unknown and undiscoverable," this "is also
without juristic interest."56
The facts of constitutive process appear but dimly through Hart's
tight "framework" of appropriate linguistic usage. The indispensable
"foundations of a legal system" which Hart finds in his "secondary
rules" leave many features of constitutive process highly implicit.
Thus, he indicates that "secondary rules" are "all concerned with the
primary rules" and "specify the ways in which the primary rules may
be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the
fact of their violation conclusively determined, '5 7 but he does not
follow through with the identification and specification of the dif-
ferent types of decisions that these words would appear to anticipate.
Instead, he breaks "secondary rules" into three different types of
"rules": rules of recognition, change, and adjudication. A rule of
recognition identifies a primary rule and apparently establishes its
51. Id. at 269.
52. Id. at 42.
53. Id. at 132, 256.
54. Id. at 133.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 152.
57. HART, THE CONCEPT or LAW 92 (1961).
58. Id. at 95.
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authority."9  A rule of change "empowers an individual or body of
persons to introduce new primary rules for the conduct of the life of
the group, or of some class within it, and to eliminate old rules."60
A rule of adjudication, also "intended to remedy the inefficiency" of
a regime of "diffused social pressures," empowers "individuals to
make authoritative determinations of the question whether, on a par-
ticular occasion, a primary rule has been broken." 61 In contrast with
Kelsen, who depends upon postulation only to establish his grund-
norm, Hart insists that the "existence" of a rule of recognition is "a
matter of fact: " 62 it must be "actually accepted and employed in the
general operation of the system," and if questioned, it may be "es-
tablished by reference to actual practice-to the way in which courts
identify what is to count as law, and to the general acceptance of or
acquiescence in these identifications."6 Hart provides little informa-
tion, however, as to how these rules of recognition, change and ad-
judication are identified, established, and altered or how they are af-
fected by factors of effective control in particular social contexts.
The most he offers are fleeting references, such as that the "criteria"
provided by a rule of recognition "for identifying primary rules of
obligation" may take many forms: "these include reference to an
authoritative text; to legislative enactment; to customary practice;
to general declarations of specified persons, or to past judicial deci-
sions in particular cases.164 The important lesson from Hart's exer-
cises would appear to be that, in promoting understanding of constitu-
tive process, linguistic analysis, "the concept of a rule," and a focus
primarily upon rules are not adequate substitutes for comprehensive
social science techniques, an empirical conception of authority in
terms of community expectation, and a focus primarily upon de-
cision process.
The concern of the sociological frame for the conditions and conse-
quences of particular legal institutions and conceptions has, somewhat
surprisingly, not manifested itself in great innovations in theory or
in recommendations about constitutive process. The major writers
associated with this frame have wavered between a diffuse, mystical
emphasis-deriving from the historical frame-upon the intimate in-
terrelations of all law and social process, and an unquestioning defer-
ence to the more conventional typology of official institutions popu-
larized by the analytical frame.6 5 Thus, Ehrlich, realistically insisting
that law is created not merely by decrees from officials but also by
the informal communication of community members in cooperative
activity, describes the "enormous importance of the state for the law"
59. Id. at 92.
60. Id. at 93.
61. Id. at 94.
62. Id. at 107.
63. Id. at 105.
64. Id. at 92, 97. A more detailed appraisal from comparable perspectives
is offered by Rogoff, International Law in Legal Theory: The New Positivism,
1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 1.
65. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 28.
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as "based upon the fact that society avails itself of the state as its organ
in order to give effectual support to the law that arises in society."66
He adds:
Social forces are elemental forces, against which the will of man
cannot prevail, not for any length of time at least. The whole
question of the constitution of the state, as Montesquieu under-
stood it in his day, and as it has been mooted again and again since
then, concerns the technical task of fashioning the state so that it
may carry out the will of society with as little resistance and
friction as possible.
7
Yet Ehrlich offers no comprehensive conspectus either of authorita-
tive decision, much less of constitutive decision, or of the particular
factors that may affect decision. The exact interrelations, and even
the empirical references, of "living law" and "state law" are left ob-
scure. Although much of what Ehrlich writes could be made rele-
vant to realistic description of various authority functions, and anec-
dotal references are made to "application of law" and "finding of
law" and a tertium quid labeled "projection," 6 Ehrlich himself never
suggests a systematic categorization of different types of decisions
for purposes of inquiry. The functions with which he is concerned
are those of "juristic science" and not of authoritative decision. De-
spite his emphasis upon the spontaneous creation of law in "popular
consciousness," Ehrlich, in the final analysis, offers little guidance in
terms of procedures for exploring that consciousness and consistently
engages in minimization of the potentialities of the deliberate creation
of law through specialized institutions. 9
In contrast with his innovative theories about administration and
bureaucracy, Weber's contributions relating to the larger patterns of
constitutive process appear somewhat conventional. Weber works
with broad concepts of "political community," "state," "government,"
"public law," "private law," "separation of powers," "legislation,"
"adjudication," and so on,"9 but does not weave these concepts into a
systematic, comprehensive theory for inquiry. For Weber "political
communities" are "states" when "belief in the specific legitimacy of
political action" has increased until such communities "are consid-
ered to be capable of 'legitimizing,' by virtue of mandate or permis-
66. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PMNcnpLEs OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 153 (1936).
67. Id. at 154.
68. Id. at 403, 404.
69. Id. at 430; cf. PATTERSON, supra note 40, at 81.
70. WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SocIETY 41 (1954).
For Weber's more systematic theories about bureaucracy, see WEBER, FROM
MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY Ch. 8 (1946); WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 329 (1947). See also La Palombara, supra
note 3, at 170. Cl. 1 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 282 (1968).
HeinOnline -- 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  15 1972-1973
sion, the exercise of physical coercion by any other community. '71
The role of law in this process is further specified:
For the purpose of threatening and exercising such coercion, the
fully matured political community has developed a system of
casuistic rules to which that particular 'legitimacy' is imputed.
This system of rules constitutes the 'legal order,' and the political
community is regarded as its sole normal creator, since that com-
munity has, in modern times, normally usurped the monopoly of
the power to compel by physical coercion.
72
His itemization of the "functions" of the modern state is in static
terms:
[T]he enactment of law (legislative function); the protection of
personal safety and public order (police); the protection of
vested rights (administration of justice); the cultivation of hy-
gienic, educational, social-welfare, and other cultural interests
(the various branches of administration); and, last but not least,
the organized armed protection against outside attack (military
administration) .73
Similarly, his delineation of different types of decisions is Austinian:
According to our contemporary modes of legal thought, the activi-
ties of political organizations fall, as regards 'law,' into two
categories, viz., lawmaking and lawfinding, the latter involving
'execution' as a technical matter. Today we understand by law-
making the establishment of general norms which in the lawyers'
thought assume the character of rational rules of law. Law-
finding, as we understand it, is the 'application' of such established
norms and the legal propositions deduced therefrom by legal
thinking, to concrete 'facts' which are 'subsumed' under these
norms.
74
Within this framework Weber does, however, appropriately empha-
size the importance of the deliberate, explicit prescription of authori-
tative policy and offer a highly perceptive account of the creation of
customary expectations.7 5 His treatment of "application" and "ju-
dicial process" is, unfortunately, more concerned with styles in "legal
thought" than with sociological examination of decision process. 76
The conceptions of constitutive process employed by Pound are
wholly conventional and unsystematic. The four "theories of the
state" he distinguishes-the juristic or legal, the political, the philo-
sophical, and the sociological77-make only the most general and ob-
lique reference to comprehensive processes of authoritative decision
and effective control and to the actual perspectives and operations of
participants in such processes. All these theories, Pound insists, have
their "special purpose," making it "futile to argue that some one of
71. WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAw iN EcoNoMy Am SocIETY 341 (1954).
72. Id. at 341.
73. Id. at 342.
74. Id. at 59.
75. Id. at 65.
76. Rheinstein, Forward to WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAw IN EcoNoamY AND
SociETY xxv (1954).
77. 2 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 287 (1959).
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them alone is legitimate; 7 8 yet the principal focus of attention he es-
tablishes and maintains is upon the legal theory. "Juristically," he
writes, "we must consider the state in two aspects."
First, we look on it as the immediate practical source of legal
precepts and sanctions-as logically the condition precedent of
law, whether as legal order or as a body of authoritative grounds
of or guides to determination of controversies. It sets up and
maintains tribunals and its organs promulgate or give the stamp
of its authority to the precepts recognized and given effect in the
judicial and administrative processes. Second, we have to look
on it as a juristic person, in that certain interests are secured
by attributing private rights to the state, so that for some public
interests it is treated as a private owner (dominus) or a private
contractor.
79
The types of decisions Pound categorizes are, as this passage indi-
cates, those inherited from Montesquieu and others. The modalities
by which law is made are subsumed under the "sources and forms of
law," with a quite nonhomogenous itemization of sources in which
usage, moral and philosophical ideas, and scientific discussion are
equated with adjudication and legislation.80 The application of law
he finds largely in judicial and administrative processes, with em-
phasis upon the judicial, and his scholarly concern is more for the
"intellectual processes" which accompany application than for the op-
erational practices by which it goes forward."' Pound's broadest and
most unifying concept appears to have been that of "social control,"
but he equates religion, morality, and law as forms of social control,
and his conception of law includes three disparate "meanings. ' 82
These "meanings" are perceived as:
(1) [R]egime of adjusting relations and ordering conduct by the'
systematic and orderly application of the force of a politically
organized society. (2) The body of authoritative materials of or
grounds of or guides to determination, whether judicial or ad-
ministrative. . . . (3) What Mr. Justice Cardozo has happily
called the judicial process, to which today we must add the admin-
istrative process-the process of determining causes and contro-
versies according to the authoritative guides in order to uphold
the legal order.8 3
In describing the "science of law today" as having "developed a func-
tional attitude, asking not merely what law is and how it has come to
be but what (in all its senses) it does, how it does it, and how it may
78. Id. at 287, 298.
79. Id. at 307.
80. 3 id. at 379.
81. 4 id. Ch. 20.
82. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 40, 41 (1942).
83. Id. at 40.
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be made to do it better," Pound had a vision of a more comprehensive
interrelation of social and legal process, 4 but there is scant evi-
dence that he made this vision a working reality in his own inquiry. 5
The general theory advanced by Timasheff, with its emphasis upon
intersecting processes of authority and control, could be adapted for
comprehensive and realistic inquiry about constitutive process and
public order decisions. Timasheff aspired not merely to account for
the origins and "validity" of the particular rules of a legal system,
but also to describe the dynamisms by which the whole "legal" ap-
paratus is established and maintained. His insistence, however, upon
organized and centralized power centers as indispensable components
of control makes it difficult for him to observe how the top rulers of
a community can, in "the highest rules of constitutional law," be sub-
jected to effective self-limitation.8 6 In his view, constitutional law
"secures the distribution of dominance and submission within the so-
cial systems"8 7 and "the constitutional order . . exists as long as it
is recognized by the active power center."8 8 "In the modern state,"
he writes, "the active center is generally complex and highly struc-
turalized."8 9 He elaborates:
In accordance to the specific Constitution of a State, the monarch,
the president, the premier, et cetera, may be considered as the
head of the administration or as its supreme ruler. He has at
his command a certain number of immediate helpers called min-
isters, and these in turn a certain number of higher officials. All
are members of the same active center; the activity of each of
them refers to the same passive periphery in its totality.90
From this "complex structure" may come "a corresponding hierarchy
of legal rules."9 1 At the top of the apex, in modern democracies, is
the constitution:
Out of the mass of legal rules created with the help of the people's
representatives, one complex is kept apart, sublimated, endowed
with superiority. This is the constitution, the complex of rules ex-
pressing the hierarchy within the active center and the relative
positions of its members. A constitution forms a truly superior
level of legal rules if (1) a special procedure has been created
in order to revise it, or (2) if every law which does not form a
part of the constitution is considered to be valid only insofar it
is compatible with the constitution, or (3) if both conditions are
united, as in this country.92
84. 1 PouND, JUmSPRUDENCE 349 (1959).
85. For a somewhat broader notion of constitution, see POUND, THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF CONsTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY (1957).
For a useful survey, see Pound, Law and the State-Jurisprudence and
Politics, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1193 (1944).
86. T!ImAsHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw 17 (1939).
87. Id. at 21.
88. Id. at 260.
89. Id. at 303.
90. Id. at 202.
91. Id. at 303.
92. Id. at 304.
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From such perspectives, the application of "the term constitution"
to "nondemocratic states" is "only a misuse of the term."93 In his dis-
cussion of "changes in law," Timasheff suggests that "the idea of
legislation grew up on the ability of power structures to enforce spe-
cial commands," as was illustrated "in many advanced legal systems
of the Ancient World,"94 and insists that "customary law can be dis-
tinguished from customs and habits only by answering the question
whether this or that rule is recognized by power (especially the Power
of the State) or not.' 93 Obviously, nondemocratic states, even as non-
state entities, have constitutive processes, whether or not they are
called "constitutions," and communities change their prescriptions in
processes of communication and collaboration that may be described
only with difficulty as state-approved commands. Less emphasis
upon organized power centers and more attention to the shared ex-
pectations of community members-which may assert a high degree
of effective power wholly apart from such organized centers-could
transform Timasheff's theory into a much more adequate instrument
of inquiry into constitutive process.
The American legal realists, despite their clear and direct focus
upon authoritative decision and their stress upon the law-making
role of courts, did not extend their insights to new or comprehensive
conceptions of constitutive process. They were content to work with
largely conventional categorizations both of the phases of decision
process and of the different types of decisions. Their principal con-
cern was with the role of "judicial process" in the prescribing and
applying of functions, with other structures and functions being ac-
corded only peripheral attention.96 The approach closest to innova-
tion was that of Llewellyn, though even he left his major conceptions
diffuse and undeveloped. For "purposes of study," Llewellyn finds
it wise to break "The Law-Job" in any group into four "lesser-phases":
93. Id.
94. Id. at 288.
95. Id. at 312.
96. For an early emphasis, see CARnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1921); cf. FRANK, COURTS oN TknIa Ch. 22 (1949).
The important contribution of the realists in indicating the role of courts in
constitution making is observable in many sources. See,. e.g., RODELL, NINE
MENw-A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790-1955 (1955);
ROSTOw, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE; THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST FOR
LAW (1962); Hamilton, The Constitution-Apropos of Crosskey, 21 U. CHm.
L. REV. 79 (1953); Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution,
31 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 881 (1963); Miller & Scheflin, The Power of the Su-
preme Court in the Age of the Positive State: A Preliminary Excursus Part
One: On Candor and the Court, Or, Why Bamboozle the Natives?, 1967
DuxE L.J. 273; Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, in
ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONA.L LAW 85 (McCloskey ed. 1957).
It is well known that the realists built upon BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF
GOVERNMENT (1908) which expounds a somewhat sketchy and popular no-
tion of constitutive process.
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I. The disposition of trouble-cases.
II. The preventive channeling and the reorientation of conduct
and expectations so as to avoid trouble.
III. The allocation of authority and the arrangement of pro-
cedures which legitimatize action as being authoritative.
IV. The net organization of the group or society as a whole so
as to provide direction and incentive.
9 7
In specification of these different phases, he writes:
As the first job finds centered around its doing such institutional
devices as tribunals, legal procedure, advocacy, peace-makers and
jails; as the second finds centered about its doing such institutional
devices as rules of substantive law, statute books, law publishing
houses, sanitary inspection departments, traffic lights, preventive
policing generally-and most of usage, and much of education;
so this third task or function finds centered on its doing the "con-
stitutions" of states and of minor interest-groups, and in general
the institutional devices for allocating authority to persons or
bodies and for fixing the time or manner or procedure whereby
their say, when said, is to gain standing as being the say: the
legislature must be "in session" (though with the clock turned
back); the two houses must concur, by vote, and with a quorum;
the bill must have been "read" the proper number of times. 98
The more conventional approach of the realists may be illustrated
by Frank's mildly cynical account of authority structures within the
United States:
Nor did the framers of our federal constitution swallow Mon-
tesquieu whole. That instrument, to be sure, in Article I vests
the legislative power in Congress; in Article II, the executive
power in the President; in Article III, the judicial power in the
federal courts. But the allocation is not watertight. The Con-
stitution was, indeed criticized on that score when its adoption
was being debated. The Federalist, defending against that criti-
cism, made it plain that the Constitution "abandoned the doc-
trinaire theory of the absolute separation of the functions of
government as it was stated, for example, in the Massachusetts
Constitution." In fact, it was definitely admitted that it was
wholly impossible accurately to define the boundary lines between
the various departments, and consequently the true policy was to
devise such a balance of interests and motives as would insure,
not an absolute separation, but a substantial and enduring inter-
dependence of the three classes of powers.99
In the light of Frank's consistent emphasis upon the vagaries of "fact
finding,"'0 0 it is especially interesting that he nowhere develops a
97. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem
of Juristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355, 1373 (1940).
98. Id. at 1383-84. For comparable conceptions, see LLEWELLYN & HoEBEL,
THE CHEYENNE WAY Chs. 10-11 (1941). For an application of the basic insights
to the United States constitutive process, see Llewellyn, The Constitution as an
Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1934).
99. FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 216-17 (1942).
100. See, e.g., FRANK, A MAN's REACH: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDGE JERoAM
FRANK 180 (1965).
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conception of a viable intelligence function. The difficulty that the
realists generally had with constructing, as contrasted with realis-
tically observing, is concisely expressed by Frank:
Life, experience, as it comes to all men, teems with variety.
The variety gives richness. But that variety also means an un-
tidy, balky, untamed existence. No clear, clean patterns are
easily discernible. Uniqueness, untypicals, discontinuities, un-
sameness constantly present themselves. We encounter surprises,
shocks, frustrations-unclassifiable, deviant things and events.
Life shows up as kaleidoscopic, anarchic, impermanent, inexact,
shot through with chance, danger and caprice. 0 1
The more promising current developments in theory, which even
purport to focus upon constitutive process as a whole, would appear
to come not from legal scholars or lawyers, but from professional
political scientists and associated workers. Since ancient times politi-
cal philosophers and analysts have been concerned with the interrela-
tions both between power and other values within community proc-
esses and between authority and control within power processes. In
more recent decades, stimulated by improvements in methodology in
the social sciences generally and by demands for comparative studies,
more specialized political scientists have been seeking to create both
new comprehensive theories about aggregate processes and their in-
terrelations and new intellectual procedures for the detailed empirical
investigation of such processes and interrelations. 0 2  The various
theories these specialists proliferate differ greatly in their termino-
logical emphases upon "processes," "groups," "interests," "systems,"
"structures and functions," "decision-making," and "communications,"
but the broader frames of the empirical references they make and the
intellectual procedures they recommend would appear to be much the
same. The principal limitation remains a certain awkwardness in re-
lating authoritative expectations, whether formalized or not, to the
facts of control. Distinctions are inadequately drawn between the
decisions that are genuinely constitutive and the vast number of
ordinary decisions that have no significant impact-other than con-
firmatory-on the principal allocations of power. What remains un-
101. FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 93 (1945) (emphasis added).
102. For a useful critical review of these developments, see VILE, note 3
supra. For more popular accounts, see MACKENZIE, PoLITICs AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1967); MAYER, COMPARATIVE PoITIcAL INQUIRY, A METHODOLOGICAL
SURVEY (1972); MEEHAN, THE THEORY AND METHOD OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1965). See also Dahl, Power, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 405 (1968); Easton, Political Science, id. at 282; Eulau, Politi-
cal Behavior, id. at 203; Gross, Political Process, id. at 265; Janowitz, Political
Sociology, id. at 298; Truman, Political Group Analysis, id. at 241; THE
METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE RESEARCH (R. Holt and J. Turner eds. 1970);
Almond, Political Theory and Political Science, 60 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 869
(1966).
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done in all the different emphases is the detailed specification of the
higher-level, more comprehensive theory in terms of the different
phases of decision process and of the different types of decision out-
comes, both authoritative and controlling, which might facilitate em-
ployment of all the relevant intellectual skills in relating these de-
cision phases and outcomes to their particular conditions and conse-
quences in social and community process.
10 3
103. For one of the better approximations to a comprehensive constitutive
process, though handicapped by an inadequate conception of authority, see
ALMOND & PoWELL, JR., note 9, supra.
Many of the proffered theories founder upon a too limited conception of
the intellectual tasks of inquiry, emphasizing almost exclusively the explana-
tory or scientific task. For a broader perspective, see Caldwell, note 9, supra;
McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authori-
tative Decision, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73 (Falk
& Black eds. 1969).
For a pioneering effort in presenting the constitutional law of a national
community, see CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A MODERN PERSPECTIVE
(Lyon & Atkey eds. 1970).
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